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WASHINGTON STATE’S DUTY TO FUND K-12 
SCHOOLS: WHERE THE LEGISLATURE WENT WRONG 
AND WHAT IT SHOULD DO TO MEET ITS 
CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION 
Daniel C. Stallings 
Abstract: The Washington State Constitution makes education Washington State’s top 
priority. Article IX, section 1 proclaims that “[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make 
ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders . . . .”1 In the 
1978 case of Seattle School District v. State,2 the Washington State Supreme Court 
interpreted this language as a command to the state legislature. The Court ordered the 
legislature to fulfill its constitutional duty by defining and fully funding “basic education” 
and a “basic program of education.”3 The legislature attempted to comply by passing and 
subsequently amending the Basic Education Act and, in 2009, by passing H.B. 2261.4 This 
Comment analyzes the state’s school-funding duty in light of these legislative efforts and 
recent Washington school-funding cases. This Comment concludes that the legislature has 
not met its constitutional duty because it has not adequately defined a “basic program of 
education,” and therefore recommends that the legislature amend H.B. 2261 to bring the state 
into compliance with article IX, section 1 of the Washington State Constitution. 
INTRODUCTION 
Washington State’s constitution boasts one of the strongest K-12 
school-funding mandates of any state constitution.5 Article IX, section 1 
of the Washington State Constitution proclaims that “[i]t is the 
paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of 
all children residing within its borders . . . .”6 The Washington State 
Supreme Court has said that “[n]o other state has placed the common 
school on so high a pedestal.”7 
Yet even with the strongly worded language of the state constitution, 
Washington repeatedly falls below the national average in educational 
                                                     
1. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
2. 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). 
3. Id. at 518–19, 585 P.2d at 95. 
4. Washington Basic Education Act of 1977, ch. 359, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1606; Act of July 
26, 2009, ch. 548, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150). 
5. See Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 498, 585 P.2d 71, 84 (“Clearly, Const. art. 9, 
§ 1 is unique among state constitutions.”). 
6. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
7. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 511, 585 P.2d at 91. 
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expenditures per student.8 For example, in the 2007–08 school year, the 
national average educational expenditure per student was $10,615, and 
the highest-spending states spent nearly twice that.9 In contrast, 
Washington spent $9980 per student.10 
The Washington State Supreme Court recognized the strength of 
Washington’s school-funding mandate in the landmark 1978 case Seattle 
School District v. State.11 In that case, the Court considered a 
constitutional challenge to the use of local tax levies for K-12 school 
funding.12 The Court determined that article IX, section 1 gives rise to a 
mandatory, judicially enforceable duty13 and that the words “paramount” 
and “ample” in article IX, section 1 have their ordinary robust 
meanings.14 Finally, the Court ordered the legislature to clarify the 
precise scope of the state’s article IX, section 1 duty and to define and 
fully fund what the Court called “basic education” and a “basic program 
of education.”15 
Since 1977, the legislature has attempted to meet its constitutional 
duty by passing and amending several pieces of legislation. First, in 
1977, following the trial court decision in Seattle School District, the 
legislature passed the Basic Education Act.16 In 1993, the legislature 
substantially amended the Act to more clearly articulate the concept of 
basic education.17 Most recently in 2009, the legislature enacted H.B. 
2261, which will overhaul the state’s education funding system in 
2011.18 
Washington courts have heard several important challenges to these 
legislative efforts. In particular, the trial judge whose opinion was 
affirmed in Seattle School District, Judge Robert Doran, authored two 
                                                     
8. See SENATE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE ET AL., A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE WASHINGTON 
STATE K-12 FINANCE 21–23 (2009). 
9. Id. Cost of living varies from state to state, which may contribute to larger expenditures in 
some states. 
10. Id. 
11. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 511, 585 P.2d at 91. 
12. Id. at 481, 585 P.2d at 76.  
13. Id. at 500–04, 585 P.2d at 85–87. 
14. Id. at 510–11, 516, 585 P.2d at 91, 93. 
15. Id. at 520, 585 P.2d at 96. (“[T]he constitution requires more than a mere definition of ‘basic 
education’ or a basic program of education. . . . [T]he State also has an affirmative paramount duty 
to make ample provision for funding the ‘basic education’ or basic program of education defined.”). 
16. Washington Basic Education Act of 1977, ch. 359, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1606. 
17. Act of July 25, 1993, ch. 336, § 1, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 1293, 1294. 
18. Act of July 26, 2009, ch. 548, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331. H.B. 2261 has been passed but 
does not take effect until September 1, 2011. Id. § 804, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws at 3375. 
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highly influential school-funding opinions in the 1980s that refined both 
the state’s school-funding duty and the requirements of a constitutionally 
sufficient “basic program of education.”19 Additionally in 2010, in 
McCleary v. State, King County Superior Court Judge John Erlick held 
that the state is currently breaching its constitutional duty to make ample 
provision for education.20 
Part I of this Comment analyzes the legislature’s duty under article 
IX, section 1 and the Seattle School District decision. Part II reviews the 
legislature’s attempts to fulfill its duty. Part III discusses how 
Washington school-funding decisions after Seattle School District have 
impacted the state’s duty. Finally, Part IV concludes that the legislature 
has failed to meet its constitutional obligation and that this failure stems 
from an inadequate definition of a “basic program of education.” It 
argues that the current definition is insufficient because the state can 
comply with its statutory requirements and yet still fail to “make ample 
provision for . . . education.”21 This is because the legislature’s current 
scheme imposes no statutory funding obligation on the legislature and, 
as a practical matter, makes it extremely difficult to enforce article IX, 
section 1 in court. 
This Comment recommends that the legislature amend H.B. 2261 to 
bring the state into compliance with article IX, section 1 and Seattle 
School District. Such an amendment should do two things: First, it 
should establish formulas or standards to determine annual allocations 
for each program or service that is part of basic education. Second, it 
should require that the allocation for each program or service cover its 
actual cost. Such an amendment would provide a constitutionally 
adequate definition of a “basic program of education” and, in effect, 
would encompass the minimum cost of education within that definition. 
Moreover, amending the bill in these ways would impose a statutory 
funding obligation on the legislature22 and for practical purposes would 
                                                     
19. See Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 81-2-1713-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1983); Wash. State 
Special Educ. Coal. v. State, No. 85-2-00543-8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 1988). These opinions 
are not available in most legal databases. They are available upon request from the Office of the 
Thurston County Superior Court Clerk, and are also on file with the Washington Law Review. 
20. McCleary v. State, No. 07-2-02323-2 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010). 
21. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
22. However, any statutory funding obligation is subject to repeal or amendment by the 
legislature. See Wash. State Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Gregoire, 162 Wash. 2d 284, 301, 174 P.3d 
1142, 1150 (2007) (“Implicit in the plenary power of each legislature is the principle that one 
legislature cannot enact a statute that prevents a future legislature from exercising its law-making 
power.”); see also Kristen L. Fraser, Method, Procedure, Means, and Matter: Washington’s Law of 
Law-Making, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 447, 478 (2004). 
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make H.B. 2261 enforceable in court by removing some of the barriers 
to enforcement that exist today. These steps would help bring the state 
into compliance with its constitutional duty. 
I. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT CLARIFIED THE STATE’S 
DUTY UNDER ARTICLE IX, SECTION 1 
Seattle School District is the leading case on Washington State’s duty 
to fund K-12 schools.23 Thurston County Superior Court first heard the 
case after the Seattle School District sued the State of Washington, 
alleging that the state was not meeting its duty to “make ample provision 
for . . . education” as required by article IX, section 1.24 The school 
district argued that the state should not be able to rely on local tax levies 
to fund basic education because doing so would result in less than 
“ample” funding.25 The problem was that school districts often had 
difficulty passing levies and, as a result, could not generate enough 
revenue to meet operating costs.26 Judge Robert Doran, and ultimately 
the Washington State Supreme Court, agreed with the school district.27 
With its opinion, the state supreme court established a framework for 
understanding the state’s duty under article IX, section 1. 
This framework stressed three key foundations. First, article IX, 
section 1 gives rise to a mandatory and judicially enforceable duty.28 
Second, the words “paramount” and “ample” carry their ordinary robust 
meanings.29 Finally, as part of its duty to make ample provision for 
education, the legislature must clarify the scope of the state’s duty by 
defining and fully funding “basic education” and a “basic program of 
education.”30 
                                                     
23. See, e.g., McGowan v. State, 148 Wash. 2d 278, 283–85, 60 P.3d 67, 70–71 (2002) 
(providing an overview of school funding law in Washington and focusing heavily on Seattle 
School District). 
24. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 486, 585 P.2d 71, 78 (1978). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. See id. at 481–84, 585 P.2d at 76–77. 
28. Id. at 500–05, 585 P.2d at 85–87. 
29. Id. at 510–11, 516, 585 P.2d at 91, 93. 
30. Id. at 518–20, 585 P.2d at 95–96. 
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A. Article IX, Section 1 Gives Rise to a Mandatory, Judicially 
Enforceable Duty 
Article IX, section 1 declares that “[i]t is the paramount duty of the 
state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing 
within its borders . . . .”31 The strong tone of this wording was no 
accident. The Washington State Constitution’s framers were mindful 
that other states had neglected education, and they wanted to avoid 
similar problems in Washington.32 Thus, they made the state’s duty to 
fund education “paramount” and required the state to make “ample” 
provision for education.33 
Acknowledging that intent, the state supreme court in Seattle School 
District held that the state’s duty to make ample provision for education 
is both mandatory and judicially enforceable.34 The Court noted that, 
unless otherwise stated, all constitutional provisions are mandatory.35 
The Court also held that article IX, section 1 is judicially enforceable: 
the courts can order a remedy for violations of article IX, section 1.36 
The Court rejected the State’s theory that, because the duty to make 
ample provision for education lies with the legislature, any remedy for 
breach of that duty should be “political not judicial.”37 To the contrary, 
the Court held that the judiciary can and must provide a remedy for a 
breach of article IX, section 1 as part of its “power and . . . duty to 
interpret, construe, and give meaning to words, sections and articles of 
the constitution.”38 The Court’s message was clear: the legislature must 
take steps to comply with article IX, section 1.39 
                                                     
31. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
32. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 511, 585 P.2d at 91 (“[T]he convention was familiar with 
the history of school funds in the older states, and the attempt was made to avoid the possibility of 
repeating the tale of dissipation and utter loss.” (quoting Theodore L. Stiles, The Constitution of the 
State and Its Effects Upon Public Interests, 4 WASH. HIST. Q. 281, 284 (1913))). 
33. Id.; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
34. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 500–05, 585 P.2d at 85–87. 
35. Id. at 500, 585 P.2d at 85. 
36. Id. at 503–04, 585 P.2d at 87. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. See id. at 503–04, 585 P.2d at 87. 
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B. The Words “Paramount” and “Ample” Carry Their Ordinary 
Robust Meanings 
After establishing that the duty in article IX, section 1 is mandatory 
and enforceable in court, the state supreme court in Seattle School 
District next had to determine what that duty entailed. The Court began 
by focusing on two words in article IX, section 1: “paramount” and 
“ample.”40 
In interpreting the meaning of these two words, the Court, 
recognizing the forceful wording in article IX, section 1, found that 
“paramount” and “ample” carry their ordinary robust meanings.41 
“[P]aramount,” as it appears in article IX, section 1, means “chief in 
importance, supreme, preeminent . . . more important than all other 
things concerned.”42 Likewise, “ample,” as it appears in article IX, 
section 1, means “liberal, unrestrained, without parsimony, fully, 
sufficient.”43 Article IX, section 1 describes the state’s obligation to 
make ample provision for education as “the paramount duty of the 
state.”44 The phrase “paramount duty of the state” appears nowhere else 
in the Washington State Constitution,45 leading the Court in Seattle 
School District to find that the obligation to fund education is “above 
others in rank and authority,” and “dominant.”46 The Court found this 
interpretation consistent with the framers’ intent to place education 
above all other priorities.47 Accordingly, the state must make education 
funding its top legislative priority.48 As Judge Robert Doran stated in a 
later school-funding opinion,”[f]ull funding of the education program 
                                                     
40. Id. at 511, 516, 585 P.2d at 91, 93. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 511, 585 P.2d at 91 (quoting the definition of “paramount” in BERGAN EVANS, A 
DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN USAGE 350 (1957)). 
43. Id. at 516, 585 P.2d at 93. 
44. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
45. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 510, 585 P.2d at 91 (“Careful examination of our 
constitution reveals that the framers declared only once in the entire document that a specified 
function was the State’s paramount duty.”). 
46. Id. at 511, 585 P.2d at 91 (quoting the definition of “paramount” in WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1638 (1971)). 
47. Id. (“No other state has placed the common school on so high a pedestal. One who carefully 
reads Article IX might also wonder whether, after giving to the school fund all that is here required 
to be given, anything would be left for other purposes. But the convention was familiar with the 
history of school funds in the older states, and the attempt was made to avoid the possibility of 
repeating the tale of dissipation and utter loss.” (quoting Theodore L. Stiles, The Constitution of the 
State and Its Effects Upon Public Interests, 4 WASH. HIST. Q. 281, 284 (1913))). 
48. See id.  
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required by Article IX, Section[] 1 . . . must be provided as a first 
priority before any statutory program is funded.”49 
C. The Court Ordered the Legislature to Dictate the Precise Scope of 
the State’s Article IX, Section 1 Duty by Defining “Basic 
Education” and a “Basic Program of Education” 
 After reaffirming the definitions of “paramount” and “ample,” the 
state supreme court in Seattle School District turned to the question of 
what the state must do to meet its constitutional duty. Instead of defining 
the duty itself, the Court held that the legislature must define its precise 
scope.50 This conclusion reflects the Court’s respect for the traditional 
roles of each branch of government, desire for constitutional 
consistency, and unwillingness to micromanage education.51 With these 
roles in mind, the Court ordered the legislature to first define 
“education,” and then to specify the educational programs and services 
necessary to provide that education.52 In the Court’s parlance, the 
legislature was to define “basic education” and a “basic program of 
education.”53 
1. The Legislature Must Define “Basic Education” 
In ordering the legislature to define “basic education,” the Court 
acknowledged the argument that “education” can have no “conclusive, 
static or exact definition.”54 Nevertheless, the Court sought to give 
meaning to “education” as it appears in article IX, section 1.55 
                                                     
49. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 62, Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 81-2-1713-1 
(Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1983). 
50. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 518, 585 P.2d at 95 (“Although the mandatory duties of 
Const. art. 9, § 1 are imposed upon the State, the organization, administration, and operational 
details of the ‘general and uniform system’ required by Const. art. 9, § 2 are the province of the 
Legislature. In the latter area the judiciary is primarily concerned with whether the Legislature acts 
pursuant to the mandate and, having acted, whether it has done so constitutionally. Within these 
parameters, then, the system devised is within the domain of the Legislature.”). 
51. Id. The Court noted twenty-seven years later in Brown v. State that “out of our respect for the 
constitution’s delegation of responsibility and authority to the legislature to provide education, this 
court declined to impose specific substantive requirements at [the time of Seattle School District], 
leaving that task to the legislature.” 155 Wash. 2d 254, 258, 119 P.3d 341, 343 (2005). The Brown 
Court also noted the practical reason for this decision, stating, “this court will not micromanage 
education.” Id. at 261, 119 P.3d at 344–45. 
52. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 517–19, 585 P.2d at 94–95. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 516, 585 P.2d at 94. 
55. Id. 
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To do this, the Court began with generalities—it first established that 
the state’s duty under article IX, section 1 is to provide only a “basic 
education,”56 as opposed to “‘total education’ in the sense of all 
knowledge or the offering of all programs, subjects, or services which 
are attractive . . . .”57 Next, the Court articulated broad constitutional 
guidelines for what a basic education must include.58 Those guidelines 
reflect the central role of education59 in many facets of American 
society:  
[T]he State’s constitutional duty goes beyond mere reading, 
writing and arithmetic. It also embraces broad educational 
opportunities needed in the contemporary setting to equip our 
children for their role as citizens and as potential competitors in 
today’s market as well as in the market place of ideas. 
Education . . . must prepare our children to participate 
intelligently and effectively in our open political system[,] . . . to 
exercise their First Amendment freedoms[,] . . . [and] to be able 
to inquire, to study, to evaluate and to gain maturity and 
understanding.60 
The Court held that any constitutionally sufficient definition of basic 
education must, at a minimum, conform to these guidelines.61 Finally, 
the Court expressly left all further specifics of defining “basic 
education” to the legislature.62 To this end, the Court in Seattle School 
District ordered the legislature to define and give substantive content to 
“basic education” within these broad constitutional guidelines.63 
                                                     
56. Id. at 519, 585 P.2d at 95. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 517–18, 585 P.2d at 94–95. 
59. The United States Supreme Court noted the importance of education in Brown v. Board of 
Education: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. 
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate 
our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the 
very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child 
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust 
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
60. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 517–18, 585 P.2d at 94 (citations omitted). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 518–19, 585 P.2d at 95. 
63. Id. 
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2. The Legislature Must Define and Amply Fund a “Basic Program of 
Education” 
In addition to ordering the legislature to define “basic education,” the 
state supreme court ordered the legislature to determine what 
educational programs and services the state must provide to give 
children a basic education64 by defining what the Court called a “basic 
program of education.”65 The definition was supposed to reflect more 
than the system of public schools already in place in 1978.66 Beyond 
that, the Seattle School District Court provided little guidance.67 That 
guidance would not come until 1983 when Judge Doran interpreted 
Seattle School District as requiring a statutory definition of a “basic 
program of education” that establishes the educational programs and 
services that the state is required to provide as well as the formulas or 
standards by which full state funding of education can be determined.68 
However, the Seattle School District Court required the legislature to 
define only a “basic program of education” that would succeed in 
providing the state’s children with a “basic education.”69 
After describing how the legislature must define the scope of its 
article IX, section 1 duty, the Seattle School District Court confirmed 
that the state must also amply provide for basic education.70 In sum, the 
                                                     
64. Id. The Seattle School District opinion repeatedly refers to the legislature as being required to 
provide a definition of “basic education” and a “basic program of education.” See, e.g., id. at 518–
19, 585 P.2d at 95 (“[T]he Legislature is obligated to give specific substantive content to the word 
[‘education’] and to the program it deems necessary to provide that ‘education.’”) (emphasis 
added). 
65. Id. at 519, 585 P.2d at 95 (“[W]e shall refer to the Legislature’s obligation as one to provide 
‘basic education’ through a basic program of education . . . .”) (emphasis added). As a corollary, 
any constitutionally sufficient basic program of education must provide education to the state’s 
children at a level commensurate with the broad constitutional guidelines set forth by the Court in 
Seattle School District. Id. at 517–19, 585 P.2d at 94–95. 
66. Id. at 519, 585 P.2d at 95 (“[W]e note that the Legislature has heretofore enacted laws to 
‘provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.’ However, it has not as yet fully 
implemented Const. art. 9, §§ 1 and 2 by defining or giving substantive content to ‘basic education’ 
or a basic program of education. Thus, the Legislature must hereafter act to comply with its 
constitutional duty by defining and giving substantive meaning to them.”). 
67. See id. 
68. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 60, Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 81-2-1713-1 
(Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1983) (“The State’s constitutional duty to make ample provision for the 
educational program required by Article IX requires that the Legislature establish in law the 
educational programs and services to which all children are entitled and the formulas or standards 
by which full state funding of such education can be determined.”). 
69. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 518–20, 585 P.2d at 95–96. 
70. Id. at 520, 585 P.2d at 96 (“[T]he constitution requires more than a mere definition of ‘basic 
education’ or a basic program of education. . . . [T]he State also has an affirmative paramount duty 
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state can fulfill its duty under article IX, section 1 by defining “basic 
education,” defining a “basic program of education,” and then fully 
funding that program.71 
II. THE LEGISLATURE ATTEMPTED TO COMPLY WITH ITS 
ARTICLE IX, SECTION 1 DUTY 
After clarifying the state’s duty under article IX, section 1, the Court 
in Seattle School District expressed its “great faith in the Legislature and 
its ability to define ‘basic education’ and a basic program of 
education . . . .”72 The legislature appeared to make good on this “great 
faith” when it passed the Basic Education Act of 1977, even before the 
state supreme court handed down Seattle School District in 1978.73 The 
Act and its subsequent amendments define “basic education” and 
attempt to define a “basic program of education.”74 
A. The Basic Education Act of 1977 and Its Subsequent Amendments 
Define “Basic Education” 
The definition of “basic education” that appeared in the Basic 
Education Act of 1977 was phrased in extremely broad terms, and is 
now little more than a historical artifact.75 That definition was part of 
Washington law from 1977 until 1993, when the legislature passed a 
new definition.76 
                                                     
to make ample provision for funding the ‘basic education’ or basic program of education defined.”). 
71. Id. at 522, 585 P.2d at 97 (“Thus we hold, compliance with Const. art. 9, §§ 1 and 2 can be 
achieved only if sufficient funds are derived, through dependable and regular tax sources, to permit 
school districts to provide ‘basic education’ through a basic program of education in a ‘general and 
uniform system of public schools.’”). 
72. Id. at 537, 585 P.2d at 104. 
73. Washington Basic Education Act of 1977, ch. 359, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1606. 
74. See id. §§ 1–6, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1606–12. 
75. The definition read as follows: 
[Basic Education must] provide students with the opportunity to achieve those skills which are 
generally recognized as requisite to learning. Those skills shall include the ability: 
(1) To distinguish, interpret and make use of words, numbers and other symbols, including 
sound, colors, shapes, and textures; 
(2) To organize words and other symbols into acceptable verbal and nonverbal forms of 
expression, and numbers into their appropriate functions; 
(3) To perform intellectual functions such as problem solving, decision making, goal setting, 
selecting, planning, predicting, experimenting, ordering and evaluating; and 
(4) To use various muscles necessary for coordinating physical and mental functions. 
Id. §1, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1606–07. 
76. See Act of July 25, 1993, ch. 336, § 101, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 1293, 1294. 
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The 1993 revision of the definition of “basic education” was part of a 
larger legislative effort to adopt mandatory education standards.77 The 
legislature called these standards “essential academic learning 
requirements,” or “EALRs.”78 The goal of the EALRs was to “develop a 
public school system that focuses more on the educational performance 
of students.”79 The revised definition of “basic education,” which is 
substantially similar to the definition in place today, used language that 
matched the language in the EALRs: 
[Basic education must] provide students with the opportunity to 
become responsible citizens, to contribute to their own 
economic well-being and to that of their families and 
communities, and to enjoy productive and satisfying lives. To 
these ends, the goals of each school district, with the 
involvement of parents and community members, shall be to 
provide opportunities for all students to develop the knowledge 
and skills essential to: 
(1) Read with comprehension, write with skill, and communicate 
effectively and responsibly in a variety of ways and settings; 
(2) Know and apply the core concepts and principles of 
mathematics; social, physical, and life sciences; civics and 
history; geography; arts; and health and fitness; 
(3) Think analytically, logically, and creatively, and to integrate 
experience and knowledge to form reasoned judgments and 
solve problems; and 
(4) Understand the importance of work and how performance, 
effort, and decisions directly affect future career and educational 
opportunities.80 
By including an identifiable set of academic skills and language from the 
EALRs, the legislature provided a greater level of detail and specificity 
to its definition of basic education.81 This definition remains in place 
today with only a few minor changes enacted in 200782 and 2009.83 The 
                                                     
77. See id. § 1, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1293–94. 
78. Id. § 201, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1295. EALRs are standards that define what each student 
is supposed to know at each grade level. The current EALRs can be found at http://standards. 
ospi.k12.wa.us. 
79. Act of July 25, 1993 § 1, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1293. 
80. Id. § 101, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1294. 
81. See id. § 1, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1293–94. 
82. See Act of July 22, 2007, ch. 400, 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 1826. Most changes made in the 
2007 revision were minor. For example, the legislature revised subsection (1) to read: “Read with 
comprehension, write effectively, and communicate successfully in a variety of ways and settings 
and with a variety of audiences.” Id. § 1, 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1826–27. 
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legislature presently deems its definition of basic education compliant 
with the requirements of article IX, section 1.84 
B. The Legislature Also Attempted to Define a “Basic Program of 
Education” 
In addition to defining “basic education,” the legislature has 
attempted to define a “basic program of education.”85 The legislature’s 
first attempt came in the Basic Education Act of 1977,86 and several 
minor amendments followed in subsequent years.87 Then, in 2009, the 
definition of a “basic program of education” received a major overhaul 
with the passage of H.B. 2261.88 At each step, the legislature has deemed 
its definition compliant with its duty under article IX, section 1.89 
The legislature’s first attempt to define a “basic program of 
education” in 197790 had two key components: a “minimum hours 
requirement,”91 and a requirement that the legislature adopt a formula for 
funding education every two years.92 
The “minimum hours requirement” defined the state’s “basic program 
of education” as comprising a minimum number of hours of instruction 
each school district needed to offer each student.93 These minimums 
                                                     
83. See Act of July 26, 2009, ch. 548, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331. The 2009 changes came with 
H.B. 2261, which substantially altered basic education funding but left the definition of basic 
education largely intact, making only one minor change: whereas the 2007 version began with “The 
goal of the basic education act for the schools of the state of Washington set forth in this chapter 
shall be,” the 2009 version begins with “A basic education is an evolving program of instruction 
that is intended to . . . .” Id. § 103, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws at 3334. 
84. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.200 (2009) (“The program of basic education established under 
this chapter is deemed by the legislature to comply with the requirements of Article IX, section 1 of 
the state Constitution.”). 
85. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.150.220, .260 (2009). 
86. See Washington Basic Education Act of 1977, ch. 359, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1606. 
87. See McGowan v. State, 148 Wash. 2d 278, 285, 60 P.3d 67, 70 (2002) (“Additional 
legislation has been passed from time to time establishing or relating to various educational 
programs. Some of the legislation has been determined to be part of basic education and some has 
not (either by legislature or by a court determination).”). 
88. See Act of July 26, 2009, ch. 548, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331. 
89. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.200 (2009) (“The program of basic education established under 
this chapter is deemed by the legislature to comply with the requirements of Article IX, section 1 of 
the state Constitution.”). 
90. See Washington Basic Education Act of 1977. 
91. Id. § 3, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1607–08 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 28A.150.220 (2009)). 
92. Id. § 5, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1609–11 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 28A.150.260 (2009)). 
93. Id. § 3, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1607–08. 
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were coupled with a requirement that the hours include instruction in 
specified subject areas such as math, social studies, and science.94 The 
requirement did not list the programs or services—such as janitorial 
services, special education services, textbooks, classroom materials, and 
so on—that the state was required to fund to ensure it was providing 
students with a “basic education.”95 
The second component of the legislature’s original “basic program of 
education” required the legislature to adopt a funding formula for 
education every two years.96 The requirements for this formula were 
minimal: First, the formula needed to “provide appropriate recognition” 
of certified staff costs (e.g., teachers, instructors, and administrators), 
classified staff costs (non-certified school district employees), 
“nonsalary” costs, and extraordinary costs associated with operating 
schools in remote areas.97 Second, the formula needed to meet certain 
staffing ratio requirements.98 The statute did not mention any specific 
programs or services that schools need in order to provide a basic 
education.99 
In subsequent years, the legislature made several adjustments to its 
definition of “basic program of education.”100 It made only minor 
amendments between 1977 and 1991,101 but made more substantial 
changes in 1992.102 Even after 1992, the definition retained the 
                                                     
94. Id. For example, for students in grades one through three, a “minimum of ninety-five percent 
of the total program hour offerings shall be in the basic skills areas of reading/language arts, 
mathematics, social studies, science, music, art, health and physical education.” Id. § 3, 1977 Wash. 
Sess. Laws at 1607. 
95. See id. § 3, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1607–11. 
96. Id. § 5, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1609–11. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. § 5, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1610–11 (“[T]he formula adopted by the legislature shall 
reflect a ratio of not less than fifty certificated personnel to one thousand annual average full time 
equivalent students and one classified person to three certificated personnel.”). 
99. See Washington Basic Education Act of 1977. 
100. For a description of these amendments, see McGowan v. State, 148 Wash. 2d 278, 285, 60 
P.3d 67, 70 (2002). 
101. In 1979, the legislature made several modifications to the program-offering requirements for 
each grade level, including exempting special education students from certain requirements so that 
“the unique needs, abilities or limitations of such students may be met.” See Act of Sept. 1, 1979, 
ch. 250, § 1, 1979 Wash. Sess. Laws 2029, 2032. In 1982, the legislature extended the length of the 
kindergarten school year. See Act of June 10, 1982, ch. 158, 1982 Wash. Sess. Laws 633. In 1990, 
the legislature reorganized the Code and placed the basic program of education provisions in their 
current locations. See Act of June 7, 1990, ch. 33, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 170 (moving the basic 
education provisions to their current locations at RCW sections 28A.150.220 and .260). 
102. See Act of June 11, 1992, ch. 141, 1992 Wash. Sess. Laws 574. The 1992 amendments made 
three major revisions. First, the legislature reduced the total number of hours school districts were 
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minimum-hours requirement and the biennial-funding-formula 
requirement.103 
It was not until 2009 that the legislature substantially altered the 
structure of the “basic program of education” by passing H.B. 2261.104 
That bill listed the educational programs and services the state must 
provide to give students a “basic education,”105 revising the 1992 statute 
in three ways: First, H.B. 2261 defines a “basic program of education” 
as “that which is necessary to provide the opportunity to develop the 
knowledge and skills necessary to meet the state-established high school 
graduation requirements.”106 Second, H.B. 2261 requires that school 
districts provide: (1) instruction in the essential academic learning 
requirements, (2) instruction that allows students an opportunity to 
graduate from high school, (3) supplemental instruction for 
underachieving students through the state’s learning assistance program, 
(4) transitional-bilingual education, (5) special education, and (6) 
programs for highly capable students.107 
Third, H.B. 2261 requires for the first time that the legislature, in 
adopting its biennial funding formula, make allocations for certain 
specific programs and services.108 In particular, H.B. 2261 requires the 
legislature to allocate funds for (1) librarians and media, (2) student-
health services, (3) guidance counselors, (4) professional-development 
coaches, (5) teaching assistance, (6) office and technology support, (7) 
custodians, (8) classified staff, (9) student technology, (10) utilities, (11) 
curriculum, (12) textbooks, (13) library materials, and (14) instructional 
supplies.109 H.B. 2261 stops short of requiring the legislature to fund the 
actual cost of each of these programs, and instead specifies that the 
legislature must make “allocations” for these programs.110 The 2009 
amendments, which take effect in 2011, represent a major change to the 
legislature’s definition of “basic program of education.” 
                                                     
required to offer and made alterations to the terminology used to describe these hours. Id. § 503, 
1992 Wash. Sess. Laws at 587–88. Second, the legislature eliminated all grade-level differences in 
the minimum hours requirements. Id. § 503, 1992 Wash. Sess. Laws at 588–89. Finally, the 
legislature required school districts to offer programs that reflected the new EALR standards. Id. 
§ 503, 1992 Wash. Sess. Laws at 589. 
103. See id. §§ 503–507, 1992 Wash. Sess. Laws at 588–95. 
104. Act of July 26, 2009, ch. 548, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331. 
105. Id. §§ 104–106, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws at 3336–42. 
106. Id. § 101, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws at 3333. 
107. Id. § 104, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws at 3336. 
108. Id. § 106, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws at 3339–42. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
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III. A NUMBER OF LENGTHY AND COMPLEX CASES REFINED 
THE STATE’S DUTY TO FUND K-12 SCHOOLS 
In the wake of Seattle School District and the Basic Education Act of 
1977, Washington courts reviewed numerous challenges to the adequacy 
of the state’s school-funding system. Two early decisions by Thurston 
County Superior Court Judge Robert Doran clarified the nature of the 
state’s duty and underscored the seriousness of the state’s responsibility 
to fund K-12 schools.111 Each of these decisions followed a lengthy and 
complex trial.112 Most recently, after an eight-week trial that ended in 
February 2010,113 King County Superior Court Judge John Erlick 
concluded that the state is still failing to meet its duty to fund K-12 
schools.114 
A. Judge Doran Clarified the State’s Duty and Underscored Its 
Seriousness in Two Decisions Following Seattle School District 
After Seattle School District and the passage of the Basic Education 
Act of 1977, Washington courts were quickly called on to clarify the 
state’s duty under article IX, section 1. The task fell largely to Judge 
Robert Doran, author of the trial court opinion that the Supreme Court of 
Washington affirmed in Seattle School District.115 In the decade 
following Seattle School District, Judge Doran authored two school-
funding opinions that reaffirmed the strong mandate of article IX, 
section 1 and urged the state to make ample provision for education.116 
Each of the opinions followed a complex trial involving difficult 
constitutional and statutory questions.117 Neither opinion was appealed 
                                                     
111. See Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 81-2-1713-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1983); Wash. 
State Special Educ. Coal. v. State, No. 85-2-00543-8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 1988). 
112. The trial in Seattle School District lasted roughly six weeks. E-mail from Michael Hoge, 
General Counsel for Seattle School District during Seattle School District to author (May 21, 2010) 
(on file with the Washington Law Review). The legal challenge in Washington Special Education 
Coalition was narrower but still involved extensive briefing and presentation of evidence. The trial 
stretched over a period of several months due to scheduling difficulties, although presentation of 
evidence was limited to six to eight days and arguments lasted approximately two days. E-mail from 
Howard Powers, Counsel for the Washington Special Education Coalition in Washington Special 
Education Coalition to author (May 22, 2010) (on file with the Washington Law Review). 
113. See McCleary v. State, No. 07-2-02323-2 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010). 
114. Id. 
115. See Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 53950, (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 1977). 
116. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 81-2-1713-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1983); Wash. State 
Special Educ. Coal. v. State, No. 85-2-00543-8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 1988). 
117. See supra note 116; see also supra note 112. 
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and both are regarded as persuasive, well-reasoned law.118 
The first of these opinions was the 1983 case Seattle School District 
v. State,119 which resolved Seattle School District’s challenge to the 
adequacy of K-12 school funding under article IX, section 1.120 In that 
case, not to be confused with others of the same name, Judge Doran 
concluded that, as of 1983, the state was not amply funding basic 
education.121 Further, the judge held that full funding of basic education 
must be the legislature’s first priority and must be funded before any 
other statutory program.122 To emphasize this point, he drew attention to 
the fact that the state’s duty is not suspended during periods of fiscal 
crisis.123 
In the same opinion, Judge Doran provided clarification regarding the 
state’s “basic program of education.” Specifically, he held that the state 
is required to codify the programs and services to which children are 
entitled under article IX, section 1, and also to establish formulas or 
standards by which full state funding of those programs can be 
determined.124 He also held that once the legislature has established full 
funding for a basic education program, the legislature cannot 
subsequently reduce funding for that program.125 Finally, he held that 
certain programs (including transportation,126 special education,127 and 
remediation for students lacking basic skills128) needed to be included in 
a “basic program of education” while others (including extracurricular 
                                                     
118. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 155 Wash. 2d 254, 262 n.2, 119 P.3d 341, 345 n.2 (2005) (citing 
Judge Doran’s school-funding opinions with approval). 
119. No. 81-2-1713-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1983). This opinion is also known as “Doran II,” 
or “School Funding II.” 
120. See id. 
121. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 65, Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 81-2-1713-1 
(Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1983) (“Petitioners have sustained their burden of proof that the State has 
not fully funded the educational program established to meet the current needs of the children of 
this State under Article IX, Sections 1 and 2.”). 
122. Id. at 62. 
123. Id. at 62–63. 
124. Id. at 60. 
125. Id. at 65. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 66. 
128. Id. at 68. 
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programs,129 food services,130 and programs for gifted and talented 
students131) did not. 
Judge Doran’s rulings, particularly his ruling that special education is 
part of basic education, foreshadowed the next challenge in 1987: 
Washington State Special Education Coalition v. State.132 In that case, 
after another highly involved trial over which he presided, Judge Doran 
set forth the principle that funding that falls below the “actual cost” of an 
educational program cannot be considered “ample” under article IX, 
section 1.133 Judge Doran articulated this principle in the context of 
special education, finding the state’s special-education funding formula 
unconstitutional under article IX, section 1134 because the state’s special 
education allocations must be “based as closely as reasonably 
practicable on the actual cost of the special education needs,” and 
because the state’s allocations did not cover the actual cost of special 
education in some school districts.135 
B. In February 2010, After an Eight-Week Trial, King County 
Superior Court Judge John Erlick Ruled that the State Is Not 
Meeting Its Constitutional Duty to Fund Basic Education 
After Judge Doran’s opinions in the 1980s, Washington courts issued 
additional school-funding opinions, none of which altered the core 
holdings of Seattle School District.136 Legal challenges have occurred 
                                                     
129. Id. at 64. 
130. Id. at 66. 
131. Id. at 69. 
132. No. 85-2-00543-8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 1988). This opinion is also known as “Doran 
III,” or “School Funding III.” 
133. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9–10, 14, Wash. State Special Educ. Coal. v. 
State, No. 85-2-00543-8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 1988). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 9, 14 (“The handicapped program funding allocation formula . . . [f]ails to satisfy to 
some extent the full funding mandate of Article IX, Sections 1 and 2, as determined by this Court in 
School Funding II that fully sufficient funds be provided and distributed in a manner that is based as 
close as reasonably practicable on the actual cost of the special educational needs . . . .”). Special 
education also receives federal funds. See generally Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, 
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485 (2004). 
136. After the Doran opinions, the Washington State Supreme Court considered three school 
funding cases prior to 2009. None of these decisions decided whether the state had properly defined 
a “basic program of education,” or whether the state was amply funding education. In Tunstall v. 
Bergeson, 141 Wash. 2d 201, 5 P.3d 691 (2000), the Court interpreted Article IX’s “all children 
residing within its borders” language, deciding that state prisoners over the age of eighteen do not 
have a constitutional right to a basic education. In McGowan v. State, 148 Wash. 2d 278, 60 P.3d 67 
(2002), and Brown v. State, 155 Wash. 2d 254, 119 P.3d 341 (2005), the Court considered whether 
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more frequently in recent years, with two in 2009 alone.137 This 
intensification came to a head in 2010, when King County Superior 
Court Judge John Erlick decided McCleary v. State.138 
McCleary was a declaratory judgment action by the Network for 
Excellence in Washington Schools (“NEWS”), a coalition of school 
districts and other organizations interested in education.139 NEWS asked 
the court to declare that the state is not amply funding education as 
required by article IX, section 1.140 After a comprehensive eight-week 
bench trial addressing both constitutional questions and contested issues 
of fact,141 Judge Erlick issued a decision on February 4, 2010.142 He held 
that the state is not amply funding education as required by article IX, 
section 1143 and that H.B. 2261 does not bring the state into compliance 
with article IX, section 1 because it fails to impose mandatory funding 
obligations.144 In other words, H.B. 2261 does not pass constitutional 
muster because it requires only that the legislature “make allocations” 
for programs, not that it make any particular allocations.145 Judge Erlick 
ordered the state to comply with its duty, stating that “[i]t is the 
responsibility of the Legislature to effectuate that primary priority of 
                                                     
certain statutory programs had or had not been added to the legislature’s definition of a basic 
program of education. 
137. Sch. Districts’ Alliance for Adequate Funding of Special Educ. v. State, 149 Wash. App. 
241, 202 P.3d 990 (2009); Federal Way Sch. Dist. v. State, 167 Wash. 2d 514, 219 P.3d 941 (2009). 
In School Districts’ Alliance, Division II of the court of appeals rejected a challenge to the state’s 
special education funding formula, finding that the formula did make ample provision for special 
education. School District’s Alliance, 149 Wash. App. 241, 202 P.3d 990. However, the court of 
appeals did not weigh in on whether the state was meeting its broader duty to amply fund education 
for all children. See id. The Washington State Supreme Court granted review of this case on 
September 9, 2009. See Sch. Districts’ Alliance for Adequate Funding of Special Educ. v. State, 166 
Wash. 2d 1024, 217 P.3d 337 (2009). In Federal Way, the Washington State Supreme Court 
rejected the Federal Way School District’s claim that the state’s education funding formulas were 
not “uniform.” Federal Way’s challenge was based primarily on article IX, section 2, not section 1, 
and the court dismissed the minimal article IX, section 1 claims. Federal Way, 167 Wash. 2d at 
527–28, 219 P.3d at 948. 
138. McCleary v. State, No. 07-2-02323-2 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010). 
139. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6, McCleary v. State, No. 07-2-02323-2 
(Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010). 
140. Id. at 3. 
141. Id. at 2. 
142. Id. at 73. 
143. Id. at 65. Judge Erlick found that the petitioners had proved this “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” despite needing to prove it only by a preponderance of the evidence. 
144. Id. at 64. 
145. Id. 
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funding basic education, and to determine how that can be 
accomplished. But it must be accomplished.”146 
IV. THE LEGISLATURE’S DEFINITION OF A “BASIC 
PROGRAM OF EDUCATION” IS INADEQUATE AND 
SHOULD BE AMENDED 
Compliance with the Basic Education Act or H.B. 2261 is not enough 
to meet the state’s constitutional obligation under article IX, section 1.147 
The problem with these statutes is that each fails to adequately define a 
“basic program of education.” These inadequate definitions make it 
possible for the legislature to comply with all statutory school funding 
requirements while still failing to “make ample provision 
for . . . education.”148 This is particularly worrisome in light of the fact 
that the legislature currently deems compliance with the Basic Education 
Act and H.B. 2261 enough to fulfill its constitutional obligation under 
article IX, section 1.149 
The problem is twofold. First, neither “basic program of education” 
definition150 places the legislature under any statutory obligation151 to 
amply fund any particular educational program or service in any given 
year or to amply fund the actual cost of providing the state’s children 
with a basic education.152 Rather, the legislature can adjust its 
educational funding formula as needed to meet short-term political 
                                                     
146. Id. at 70. 
147. Id. at 64–65. 
148. Indeed, Washington courts have found that the state is failing in its constitutional duty to 
amply fund education in 1977, 1983, 1987, and 2010. See Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 53950 
(Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 1977); Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 81-2-1713-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 7, 1983); Wash. State Special Educ. Coal. v. State, No. 85-2-00543-8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 
22, 1988); McCleary v. State, No. 07-2-02323-2 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010). 
149. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.200 (2009) (“The program of basic education established 
under this chapter is deemed by the legislature to comply with the requirements of Article IX, 
section 1 of the state Constitution.”). It is questionable whether the separation of powers doctrine 
allows a legislature to deem its own law constitutionally sufficient. Nevertheless, it is enough for 
present purposes that this statement provides evidence of the legislature’s position that statutory 
compliance is sufficient for constitutional compliance. 
150. The state currently operates under the definition contained in the Basic Education Act, as 
amended. The amendments in H.B. 2261 do not take effect until September 1, 2011. Act of July 26, 
2009, ch. 548, § 804, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331, 3375. 
151. Note that any such statutory obligation would be subject to repeal or amendment by the 
legislature. See supra note 22. 
152. See Washington Basic Education Act of 1977, ch. 359, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1606; Act of 
July 26, 2009, ch. 548, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331. 
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goals153 and still credibly maintain that it is in compliance with article 
IX, section 1.154 Second, as a practical matter, the state’s duty under 
current law is difficult to enforce without a lengthy and costly trial like 
McCleary.155 Without the safeguards of practical enforceability or a 
statutory funding obligation, the legislature can easily run afoul of its 
constitutional duty.156 
This Part argues first that the legislature has not adequately defined a 
“basic program of education,” and second that the current law’s lack of 
safeguards—either in the form of a statutory obligation imposed on the 
legislature or a method for practical enforcement—allows the state to 
run afoul of its constitutional duty under article IX, section 1. Finally, it 
recommends amending H.B. 2261 to bring the state into compliance 
with its constitution. 
A. The Legislature Has Not Adequately Defined a “Basic Program of 
Education” 
Neither the Basic Education Act as amended nor H.B. 2261 provides 
a constitutionally sufficient definition of a “basic program of education.” 
As Judge Doran made clear, an adequate definition must identify the 
programs and services to which all children are entitled, and provide 
formulas or standards by which full state funding of these programs and 
services can be determined.157 Defining a “basic program of education” 
in a manner that fails in either of these respects disobeys the 
constitutional command presented in Judge Doran’s 1983 Seattle School 
District opinion.158 
The current law, the 1977 Basic Education Act, as amended, does not 
adequately define a “basic program of education” because it fails to 
                                                     
153. See Washington Basic Education Act of 1977; Act of July 26, 2009, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 
3331. 
154. See supra note 149. 
155. The first trial on this issue, Seattle School District, required more than fifteen weeks of trial. 
Memorandum Opinion at 2, Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 53950 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 1977). 
The most recent trial on this issue, McCleary v. State, required an eight-week trial. Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law at 2, McCleary v. State, No. 07-2-02323-2 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010). 
See also supra note 112. 
156. See supra note 148. 
157. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 60, Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 81-2-1713-1 
(Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1983) (“The State’s constitutional duty to make ample provision for the 
educational program required by Article IX requires that the Legislature establish in law the 
educational programs and services to which all children are entitled and the formulas or standards 
by which full state funding of such education can be determined.”).  
158. Id. 
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establish the educational programs or services to which all children are 
entitled.159 Instead, the Basic Education Act establishes that the state’s 
“basic program of education” consists of a minimum number of 
instructional hours.160 It falls short of articulating which programs or 
services the state must fund.161 Instead, the Act requires only that the 
legislature provide funding for teachers, administrators, classified staff, 
and non-salary costs.162 Because funding these expenses alone would not 
provide the state’s children with the “basic education” the state 
constitution requires,163 the Basic Education Act fails to adequately 
define a “basic program of education.” 
The state’s most recent attempt to define a “basic program of 
education,” scheduled to take effect on September 1, 2011, also falls 
short of the constitutional minimum. H.B. 2261 fails to adequately 
define a “basic program of education” because it does not establish 
statutory formulas or standards by which full state funding of each 
educational program or service can be determined.164 H.B. 2261, unlike 
the Basic Education Act, clearly articulates the programs and services 
the state is required to amply fund,165 and for this reason represents a 
major step forward. However, H.B. 2261 requires only that the 
legislature “make allocations” for each program or service listed.166 This 
vague, aspirational language does not meet the constitutional 
requirement that an adequate definition of a “basic program of 
education” include formulas or standards to determine full funding.167 
                                                     
159. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.150.220, .260 (2009). 
160. Id. § 28A.150.220. 
161. See id. §§ 28A.150.220, .260. 
162. Id. § 28A.150.260. 
163. For example, the Basic Education Act does not require recognition of costs such as student 
health services, custodial costs, student technology, utilities, curriculum, textbooks, library 
materials, instructional supplies, preparatory and technical courses, or programs for underachieving 
students, transitional-bilingual education, special education, and highly capable students. See id. 
Without, for example, textbooks and instructional supplies, a school could not reasonably be 
expected to operate. 
164. See Act of July 26, 2009, ch. 548, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331. 
165. Id. §§ 104–106, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws at 3336–42. 
166. Id. 
167. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 60, Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 81-2-1713-1 
(Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1983) (“The State’s constitutional duty to make ample provision for the 
educational program required by Article IX requires that the Legislature establish in law . . . the 
formulas or standards by which full state funding of such education can be determined.”). 
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B. The Current Law’s Lack of Safeguards Allows the State to Run 
Afoul of Its Constitutional Duty 
The legislature’s inadequate definition of a “basic program of 
education” has consequences for the state. It allows the legislature to 
comply with all statutory school-funding requirements, credibly claim it 
is complying with its constitutional duty,168 and yet still fail to “make 
ample provision . . . for education.”169 Two deficiencies are to blame: 
First, despite the fact that its language deems the legislature in 
compliance with article IX, section 1,170 the current definition fails to 
impose any statutory funding obligation on the legislature.171 Second, the 
definition makes it exceedingly difficult to enforce the state’s duty in 
court, thereby blunting an important regulator of legislative action.172 
The first of these deficiencies—the lack of a statutory obligation—is 
apparent in the definition of a “basic program of education” in the Basic 
Education Act. The Act would impose an obligation on the legislature if 
it actually required allocations for certain programs or services in all 
circumstances, despite budget shortfalls or other political considerations. 
However, under the current Act, the legislature need only adopt an 
education funding formula every two years and fund the newly adopted 
formula; with some limitations,173 the Basic Education Act deems any 
formula adopted by the legislature adequate to meet the state’s duty.174 
Thus, the legislature can alter the funding formula and cut school 
funding to meet budget shortfalls or achieve other political goals and 
still claim to be satisfying its constitutional duty.175 In other words, the 
legislature is under no statutory obligation to make any specific dollar-
amount allocation.176 
                                                     
168. See supra note 149. 
169. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1; see supra note 148. 
170. See supra note 149. 
171. See Washington Basic Education Act of 1977, ch. 359, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1606; Act of 
July 26, 2009, ch. 548, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331. 
172. See supra note 155.  
173. For example, the formula is required to recognize certain minimum staffing ratios. See 
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.260 (2009). 
174. See supra note 149. 
175. See id. 
176. However, the legislature cannot reduce basic education allocations that have been 
determined by the legislature to be part of basic education. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law at 65, Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 81-2-1713-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1983). In addition, 
funding for special education must reflect the actual cost of providing special education. Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9–10, 14, Wash. State Special Educ. Coal. v. State, No. 85-2-
00543-8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 1988). 
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The same problem is inherent in H.B. 2261. H.B. 2261 would impose 
an obligation on the legislature if it were to require the legislature to 
make specific allocations in all circumstances, despite budget shortfalls 
or other political considerations. However, like the Basic Education Act, 
H.B. 2261 only requires the legislature to adopt an education funding 
formula every two years and fund the adopted formula.177 While H.B. 
2261 goes slightly further, requiring the legislature to make allocations 
for certain specific programs deemed to be part of basic education,178 it 
does not require the legislature to make any specific allocation for any 
program or service.179 Nor does it require allocations made for each 
program or service to reflect actual cost.180 Instead, it requires only that 
the legislature “make allocations for” each of these programs.181 Without 
some obligatory182 funding amount or formula for each program or 
service, the legislature can change its allocations every two years to meet 
budget shortfalls or achieve other political goals. Therefore, under H.B. 
2261, the state can fulfill its statutory obligation by funding whatever 
“allocations” emerge from the legislative process.183 Like the Basic 
Education Act, H.B. 2261 fails to require the legislature to allocate funds 
beyond what it chooses to allocate.184 This absence of a specific 
allocation requirement allows the state to comply with H.B. 2261, claim 
it is complying with its constitutional duty, yet still fail to “make ample 
provision for . . . education.”185 
The other deficiency is that as a practical matter both the Basic 
Education Act and H.B. 2261 are difficult to enforce in court.186 There 
are two reasons for this. First, both the Basic Education Act and H.B. 
2261 lack standards or formulas by which a judge could determine 
whether the state has met its duty to amply fund education.187 Without 
these standards or formulas, a court must consider the entire school 
                                                     
177. Act of July 26, 2009, ch. 548, §§ 105–106, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331, 3337–42. 
178. Id. § 104, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws at 3336. 
179. See id. 
180. See id. 
181. Id. 
182. Of course, a statute is obligatory only to the extent that the legislature does not repeal or 
amend it. No legislature can prevent a future legislature from repealing or amending a statute. See 
supra note 22. 
183. See Act of July 26, 2009 §§ 105–106, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws at 3337–42. 
184. See id. 
185. See supra notes 148–49; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
186. See supra note 155. 
187. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.150.220, .260 (2009); Act of July 26, 2009, 2009 Wash. Sess. 
Laws 3331. 
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funding system in the context of different constitutional interpretations 
of the state’s duty, an analysis that requires more lengthy and costly 
trials than would be necessary otherwise.188 This omission risks making 
it cost-prohibitive for school districts to exercise their rights under article 
IX, section 1 and for the judiciary to enforce the state’s duty.189 Unless a 
school district can afford extensive litigation, the state can run afoul of 
its constitutional duty with minimal consequences.190 
The second obstacle to enforcing the state’s duty in court is that 
neither the Basic Education Act nor H.B. 2261 imposes a statutory 
obligation on the state. Under either approach, whatever formula the 
legislature adopts is deemed to comply with the state’s article IX, section 
1 duty.191 Setting aside for a moment the issue of whether the separation 
of powers doctrine allows the legislature to determine the 
constitutionality of its own laws, this nuance increases the risk of having 
to fund a more complicated trial because, just as a lack of formulas or 
standards requires a more complex legal analysis, plain language 
deeming the legislature’s action constitutional forces courts’ analyses to 
extend beyond the statute itself. 
C. The Legislature Should Amend H.B. 2261 to Ensure Compliance 
with Article IX, Section 1 
Under article IX, section 1, ample funding of education is the state’s 
paramount duty.192 The state must fund education before funding any 
other statutory program.193 The state’s duty to amply fund education is 
not suspended during periods of fiscal crisis.194 Moreover, courts should 
not have the responsibility to micromanage education.195 Rather, 
compliance with article IX, section 1 is the legislature’s responsibility.196 
                                                     
188. See supra note 155. 
189. See id. 
190. See supra note 148. 
191. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.150.220, .260 (2009); Act of July 26, 2009, ch. 548, 2009 
Wash. Sess. Laws 3331. 
192. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
193. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 62, Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 81-2-1713-1 
(Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1983). 
194. Id. at 62–63. 
195. See Brown v. State, 155 Wash. 2d 254, 258–261, 119 P.3d 341, 343–45 (2005) (discussing 
the “constitution’s delegation of responsibility and authority to the legislature to provide education,” 
and stating that “[t]his court will not micromanage education.”). 
196. Id. 
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For these reasons, it is imperative that the legislature amend H.B. 2261 
in two ways. 
First, the legislature should establish statutory standards or formulas 
for funding each educational program or service that H.B. 2261 lists as 
part of basic education.197 Instead of requiring the legislature simply to 
allocate funds for each statutory program or service, as H.B. 2261 
currently requires, the legislature should codify formulas based on the 
variables that dictate the cost of each program or service. For example, 
the legislature’s formula for textbook allocations might depend on the 
number of students in the school district and the average cost of a 
suitable textbook. 
Second, the legislature should specify that allocations for each of 
these educational programs or services must reflect their actual costs.198 
An actual cost requirement would force the legislature’s formulas and 
standards—as well as its allocations—to encompass the minimum costs 
of basic education. An amendment making these two changes would 
meet the requirements for a constitutionally sufficient definition of a 
“basic program of education.”199 
An amendment incorporating these two improvements would also 
create two safeguards to help ensure compliance with article IX, 
section 1. The first safeguard would be a statutory obligation for the 
legislature to amply fund education in accordance with standards or 
formulas and actual cost. Under this more detailed scheme, the 
legislature could not adjust allocations in response to budget shortfalls or 
political goals while still complying with its statutory obligations. 
Instead, education funding would be insulated from financial and 
political pressures. While future legislatures could choose to repeal or 
                                                     
197. See Act of July 26, 2009, ch. 548, §§ 104–106, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331, 3336–42. 
198. The legislature, and not school districts, could probably best determine “actual cost.” A 
requirement that the legislature fund any costs school districts incur would likely result in inefficient 
spending. Conversely, a school district whose allocations for a particular program or service 
legitimately did not meet its costs could challenge the legislature’s determination of actual cost in 
court. A court’s resolution of an actual cost dispute would need to give appropriate deference to the 
legislature’s findings, but could rectify glaring funding shortages. 
199. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 60, Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 81-2-1713-1 
(Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1983) (“The State’s constitutional duty to make ample provision for the 
educational program required by Article IX requires that the Legislature establish in law the 
educational programs and services to which all children are entitled and the formulas or standards 
by which full state funding of such education can be determined.”); Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at 9–10, 14, Wash. State Special Educ. Coal. v. State, No. 85-2-00543-8 
(Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 1988) (“[F]ully sufficient funds [must] be provided and distributed in a 
manner that is based as close as reasonably practicable on the actual cost of the . . . educational 
needs.”). This second principle was formulated in the context of special education, but can be 
extended to basic education as a whole. 
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amend the statutory obligation,200 they could not avoid amply funding 
education within the revised statutory framework. 
As a second safeguard, the amendment would remove the complex 
litigation hurdles that exist under the present scheme, making the state’s 
duty easier to enforce in court. The amendment would give judges 
concrete standards by which to determine whether the state is fulfilling 
its duty without requiring the consideration of constitutional questions or 
an examination of the educational system as a whole. If a challenge 
arose, the judiciary would simply examine each challenged formula or 
standard to determine whether it amply funds the actual cost of the basic 
educational program or service.201 Judges could look at evidence of the 
actual cost of a particular program and compare it to the legislature’s 
allocation.202 They could analyze school-funding challenges one 
program at a time, one formula at a time, or one school district at a time 
without examining the entire school system. In addition, deference to the 
legislature’s duly enacted formulas and actual-cost determinations would 
relieve courts of the burden of micromanaging education. By minimizing 
the need for lengthy and complex trials so common in previous school-
funding challenges,203 the scheme would allow courts to enforce the 
state’s duty more efficiently and more effectively. 
For these reasons, amending H.B. 2261 to establish standards or 
formulas for each educational program or service, and requiring that 
those formulas match actual costs would make H.B. 2261 a 
constitutionally adequate “basic program of education.” The 
amendment’s safeguards would also help bring the state into compliance 
with its constitutional duty to amply fund education. 
                                                     
200. See Wash. State Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Gregoire, 162 Wash. 2d 284, 301, 174 P.3d 1142, 
1150 (2007) (“Implicit in the plenary power of each legislature is the principle that one legislature 
cannot enact a statute that prevents a future legislature from exercising its law-making power.”); see 
also Fraser, supra at 22. 
201. Adding a requirement of “actual cost” to the statute does raise the question of how to 
determine actual cost. Legislatures would likely determine this figure. See supra note 198. A trial 
court, if called upon to examine the sufficiency of the legislature’s determination, could hear 
evidence from both sides. A school district challenging an allocation for a particular program could 
present evidence of the actual cost of that program. Likewise, the legislature could conduct studies 
and make findings before establishing funding standards and formulas in law. The state could 
present these studies and findings as evidence of actual cost, and the trial court could make a 
decision with appropriate deference to the legislature’s determinations. 
202. See supra note 201. 
203. See supra note 155. 
082610 Stallings Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2010  8:18 AM 
2010] WASHINGTON’S DUTY TO FUND K-12 SCHOOLS 601 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Washington State Constitution commands the state to amply fund 
education, and Seattle School District ordered the legislature to define a 
“basic program of education.” The legislature has failed to do so. Its 
current inadequate definition of a “basic program of education” allows 
the legislature to comply with all the funding statutes for basic education 
and claim constitutional compliance, while nevertheless failing to amply 
fund education as required by article IX, section 1. The legislature 
should bring the state into compliance with its constitution by amending 
H.B. 2261 to include mandatory funding formulas for each educational 
program or service and to require that allocations match the actual cost 
of each program or service listed in H.B. 2261. These amendments 
would not only define a constitutionally adequate “basic program of 
education,” but would also help bring the state into compliance with 
article IX, section 1 by providing safeguards to prevent the state from 
running afoul of its constitutional duty. 
 
